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Abstract 
In this paper we analyze boards of directors as workgroups, i.e., groups of people that perform 
one or more tasks within an organizational context. Building on previous studies, we 
developed a model that relates group’s social-psychological processes to three different board 
tasks: service, monitoring, and networking. We tested our model through a survey on 301 
large manufacturing firms in Italy. Our findings support the idea that (a) process variables 
and, to a limited extent, demographic variables significantly influence board task 
performance; (b) board processes have a different impact on each specific board task; (c) 
board task performance varies depending upon firm and industry characteristics.  
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Beyond the Black Box of Demography: Board Processes and Task 
Effectiveness within Italian Firms 
 
Despite the increasing attention on boards of directors, there is still scant evidence on what 
determines their effectiveness (Daily, Dalton and Cannella, 2003; Roberts, McNulty and 
Stiles, 2005). Previous studies failed to provide clear evidence of the hypothesized 
relationship between board’s demographic characteristics on the one hand and the firm 
performance on the other (Dalton et al., 1998; Dalton et al., 2003; Hermalin and Weisbach, 
2003). The theoretical and methodological approaches traditionally adopted may explain this 
lack of empirical evidence. It has been suggested that reliance on agency theory and the 
extensive use of demographic variables may limit our understanding of boards of directors 
(Daily, Dalton and Cannella, 2003). 
Agency theory dominates studies of corporate governance (Dalton et al. 1998; Daily, Dalton 
and Cannella, 2003). Indeed, the agency framework provided the first satisfactory explanation 
of the separation between ownership and control in large American corporations (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). It describes the board of directors as an instrument designed to deal with the 
conflict of interests between management and shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) and 
places great emphasis on the board’s monitoring role. Furthermore, from a methodological 
viewpoint, agency theory has the advantage of being simple and of being founded on a well-
accepted model of human behavior (Daily, Dalton and Cannella, 2003); these features have 
contributed to its widespread diffusion. The extensive reliance on agency theory may have led 
scholars to place too much emphasis on the board monitoring task, diverting their attention 
away from other perspectives (Daily, Dalton and Cannella, 2003; Stiles and Taylor, 2001) 
such as resource dependence (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) or stewardship theory (Davis, 
Schoorman and Donaldson, 1997). Only few scholars have tried to compare agency theory 
with competing approaches – such as institutional theory (Judge and Zeithaml, 1992) – or to 
combine agency theory with other complementary perspectives – such as resource 
dependence (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). 
As to demographic variables, most research on boards of directors has focused on establishing 
a relationship between these variables (e.g., board size, CEO duality, outsider ratio and CEO 
ownership) and the board or the firm performance (Daily, Dalton and Cannella, 2003; 
Johnson, Daily and Ellstrand, 1996). However, the ability of demographic variables to capture 
the characteristics of intermediate processes leading to board effectiveness has been debated 
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for long time. Pfeffer (1983) argued that demographic variables may be superior compared to 
perceptual measures (such as attitudes or values), since the former are directly observable and 
hence more reliable compared to the latter. Furthermore, assuming that there is congruence 
between demographic predictors and subjective concepts (Lawrence, 1997), reliance on 
demographic variables offers the methodological advantage of parsimony: it allows scholars 
to limit their focus on a few, easy-to-measure variables (input: demographic variables; output: 
behavioral or outcome variables) whilst ignoring intervening processes which are more 
difficult to observe.  
However, it has been argued that this approach prevents the researcher from gaining any 
understanding of the processes through which inputs affect outputs (Pettigrew, 1992; Pye and 
Pettigrew, 2005; Roberts, McNulty and Stiles, 2005). For this reason, in the presence of 
complex processes and group dynamics, as in board decision-making, the use of demographic 
variables can lead to biased results (Dalton et al., 1998; Dalton et al., 2003; Johnson, Daily 
and Ellstrand, 1996; Forbes and Milliken, 1999). 
In order to overcome these limitations, scholars have recently emphasized the need to gain 
access to process data and to consider theoretical perspectives other than agency theory 
(Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003; Huse, 2000; Pye and Pettigrew, 2005; Stiles and Taylor, 
2001). A more eclectic approach has been recommended (Daily, Dalton and Cannella, 2003). 
This paper contributes to the literature on boards of directors by providing a more detailed 
analysis of the relationship between board processes and board task performance. Drawing 
from the literature on group dynamics, we consider boards as workgroups, i.e., groups of 
people “that perform one or more tasks within an organizational context” (Bettenhausen, 
1991: 346). Building on previous works (Forbes and Milliken, 1999; Huse, 2005; Zahra and 
Pearce, 1989), we developed a model that relates board processes to board task performance. 
By board processes we mean social-psychological processes pertaining to critical discussion, 
group participation and interaction, and the exchange of information (Forbes and Milliken, 
1999). Board task performance refers to the board’s ability to execute its service, monitoring, 
and networking tasks (Johnson, Daily and Ellstrand, 1996; Stiles and Taylor, 2001; Zahra and 
Pearce, 1989). We tested our model through a survey of Italy’s largest manufacturing 
companies. Our findings support the idea that (i) board processes have a positive and 
significant relationship with board task performance; (ii) board processes have a different 
impact on each specific board task; (iii) the level of board task performance depends upon the 
external context of the firm. 
In the next section, we ground our model in the existing theoretical frameworks. In the 
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following section, we describe the research method, and present sample, data collection and 
variables. We then present the results of our study and, in the final section, discuss our main 
findings, highlighting their limitations and implications for future research. 
 
Theory and Hypotheses 
 
Board tasks 
Scholars in the field of corporate governance maintain that boards of directors perform three 
key tasks: (i) the service task, i.e., the revision and evaluation of strategic decisions and the 
provision of technical advice so as to improve the firm’s strategic plans; (ii) the monitoring 
task, i.e., the control of managers and the monitoring of the firm performance so as to 
safeguard shareholders’ interests; (iii) the networking task, i.e., the provision of facilitated 
access to external resources and the reinforcement of the firm’s legitimation (Goodstein, 
Gautam and Boeker, 1994; Johnson, Daily and Ellstrand, 1996; Stiles and Taylor, 2001; 
Zahra and Pearce, 1989). 
The board service task. Boards of directors participate in the strategic decision-making 
process and support the top management in defining the strategic context of the firm (Stiles 
and Taylor, 2001). The board service task includes a set of related activities, such as 
evaluating and selecting strategic alternatives that have been developed by top managers, 
providing advice to improve the quality of strategic decisions, and so on (Andrews, 1980; 
Demb and Neubauer, 1992; Lorsch and MacIver, 1989; Styles and Taylor, 2001). A high level 
of service task performance is believed to have a positive impact on a firm’s long-term 
competitive advantage (Andrews, 1980). 
The board monitoring task. Monitoring managerial behavior is considered to be the principal 
task of the board (Berle and Means, 1932). According to agency theory, the board of directors 
is an instrument designed to safeguard shareholders’ interests from possible opportunistic 
behavior of executives (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). In the agency 
framework, boards of directors and top managers have different roles: managers have the duty 
to perform “decision management” (i.e., to generate strategic alternatives for resource 
utilization and execute these decisions), whereas boards of directors perform “decision 
control” (i.e., to select the course of conduct and control the firm performance) (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983). The board of directors performs its monitoring role through managerial control 
systems and the assessment of top management behavior (Stiles and Taylor, 2001). The 
monitoring task includes a set of related activities, such as the control of firm performance, 
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the monitoring of firm’s activities, the assessment of CEO behaviors, and so on (Johnson, 
Daily and Ellstrand, 1996; Stiles and Taylor, 2001; Zahra and Pearce, 1989). 
The board networking task. The board of directors can also facilitate access to resources 
critical to the firm success or survival (Pfeffer, 1972). Boards play an important role spanning 
boundaries, making timely information available to managers (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). 
Outside directors with high prestige and high status are usually co-opted by managers to 
increase the legitimation of the firm within its environment (Johnson, Daily and Ellstrand, 
1996; Zahra and Pearce, 1989). Furthermore, representatives of external stakeholders can be 
co-opted in order to facilitate the firm’s access to critical resources (i.e., the co-optation of 
executives from financial institutions to facilitate access to financial resources) (Johnson, 
Daily and Ellstrand, 1996). 
 
Board Processes 
Boards of directors are episodic decision-making groups facing complex tasks whose output 
is largely cognitive in nature (Forbes and Milliken, 1999). As a consequence, boards are 
vulnerable to interaction difficulties, and their effectiveness largely depends upon social-
psychological processes, such as group participation, critical discussion, and exchange of 
information (Forbes and Milliken, 1999; Milliken and Vollrath, 1991; Samra-Fredericks, 
2000a and 2000b). Three specific board processes have been proposed as antecedents of 
board task performance: cognitive conflict, efforts norms, and use of knowledge and skills 
(Forbes and Milliken, 1999; Huse, 2005). The theoretical model linking board processes to 
board task performance is presented in Figure 1. 
 
[Insert Figure 1] 
 
Cognitive conflict. Cognitive conflict refers to task-oriented differences in judgment or issue-
related disagreement among directors (Forbes and Milliken, 1999). Groups performing an 
intellectual task are more effective if their members can express multiple viewpoints and 
exchange positive and negative comments (Watson and Michaelsen, 1988). Cognitive conflict 
may arise in boardrooms because directors are a diverse group of successful people facing 
complex decisions. Board members are likely to have different perceptions of the issues and 
different opinions on the most appropriate solutions (Dutton and Jakson, 1987). Boards show 
a large variance in the degree to which they experience cognitive conflict (Lorsch and 
MacIver, 1989; Mace, 1971; Monks and Minow, 1995). Whereas some boards tend to ratify 
 5 
and ‘rubber stamp’ decisions taken elsewhere by top managers, other boards have been able 
to develop structures and processes that promote open debate and positive disagreement. This 
affects the board service task in that conflict and disagreements may induce the CEO and the 
other top managers to consider other strategic alternatives or to evaluate more carefully the 
ones on the table (Forbes and Milliken, 1999). Disagreement and critical investigation are 
beneficial also to the board monitoring performance as long as open debate makes it easier for 
directors to raise critical questions, to ask top managers for more information, to gain a 
clearer picture of the firm’s situation and to openly express a personal judgment on 
managerial behaviors (Stiles and Taylor, 2001). Finally, the presence of cognitive conflict 
inside the boardroom may intensify the feeling of urgency and increase the perception of the 
need to resort to external resources, thus improving board networking task performance 
(Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). In sum, we hypothesize that the higher 
the cognitive conflict, the higher the level of board service, monitoring, and networking task 
performance. 
 
Hypothesis 1a: Board cognitive conflict is positively related to board service task 
performance. 
Hypothesis 1b:  Board cognitive conflict is positively related to board monitoring task 
performance. 
Hypothesis 1c:  Board cognitive conflict is positively related to board networking task 
performance. 
 
Effort norms. Effort norms refer to the board’s shared beliefs on the level of effort each 
director is expected to put towards a task. Social norms play an important role in regulating 
the level of individual effort in groups, especially in collegial groups consisting of 
interdependent persons (Wageman, 1995). Directors are busy people facing many competing 
demands for their time (Lorsch and MacIver, 1989; Mace, 1971). Thus, strong effort norms 
can be expected to enhance the effort of each individual director (Forbes and Milliken, 1999). 
There is a large variance in the time and attention that boards of directors devote to 
accomplish their tasks (Lorsch and MacIver, 1989: 104-105). Some boards do not meet 
frequently and limit themselves to a formalized assessment (i.e., rubber stamp) of top 
management proposals (Mace, 1971; Stiles and Taylor, 2001). In other boards, directors 
actively participate in discussions, make the best use of their skills to perform board activities, 
make themselves available for the execution of specific tasks, and so on (Lorsch and MacIver, 
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1989; Monks and Minow, 1995; Stiles and Taylor, 2001). We expect that higher  amounts of 
time and higher levels of commitment devoted by directors to performing their tasks lead to 
significant increases in the degree to which boards are able to make useful contributions to 
strategy formulation, to control management behavior, and to facilitate the access to critical 
resources. In sum, the higher the board effort norms, the higher the level of board service, 
monitoring, and networking task performance. 
 
Hypothesis 2a:  Board effort norms are positively related to board service task performance. 
Hypothesis 2b: Board effort norms are positively related to board monitoring task 
performance. 
Hypothesis 2c: Board effort norms are positively related to board networking task 
performance. 
 
Use of knowledge and skills. Use of knowledge and skills refers to the process by which 
directors’ contributions are coordinated (Forbes and Milliken, 1999). The group’s ability to 
extract individual knowledge and skills is an important criterion of its effectiveness 
(Wageman, 1995). The presence of professional (e.g., finance, marketing, accounting, law) 
and firm-specific knowledge and skills in the board does not imply per se that the board will 
be effective in performing its tasks. An effective board requires the active use and integration 
of the directors’ expertise and skills for the benefit of group decisions. In other words, in 
effective boards, the extraction and integration of individual knowledge and skills is enabled 
by internal processes: a clear division of labor assigns specific activities and tasks to 
individual directors; the delegation of tasks to individual directors takes into account expertise 
and responsibilities; information flows smoothly between directors (Finkelstein and Mooney, 
2003). In sum, we hypothesize that the higher the use of knowledge and skills, the higher the 
level of board service, monitoring and networking task performance.  
 
Hypothesis 3a: Board use of knowledge and skills is positively related to board service task 
performance. 
Hypothesis 3b: Board use of knowledge and skills is positively related to board monitoring 
task performance. 





The Italian setting 
The Italian corporate governance system differs from both the Anglo-Saxon outsider system 
and the German-Japanese insider system. Italy, together with other European countries (such 
as France, Spain, Belgium, Portugal and Greece), can be classified in the Latin subgroup 
characterized by controlling shareholders, strong inter-company ties and a weak role of 
capital markets (De Jong, 1997).  
Italian companies are traditionally controlled by a large blockholder, usually a family. Banks 
and other financial institutions do not own large shareholdings and do not usually exert a 
significant influence on the governance of large companies. Institutional investors do not play 
a relevant role because of their limited shareholdings, their strict connections with the Italian 
banks and a regulatory environment that does not favor their activism. Finally, the stock 
market plays a limited role and the market for corporate control is almost absent (Melis 1999 
and 2000). 
Large blockholders, especially wealthy families, maintain the control of large listed 
companies through a vast array of governance mechanisms: the listing of many companies 
belonging to the same group, the issue of shares with limited voting rights, high leverage, 
mutual inter-group shareholdings, and shareholders’ agreements (Zattoni, 1999). In sum, the 
Italian governance system can be described as a system of ‘weak managers, strong 
blockholders and unprotected minority shareholders’ (Melis, 2000: 354). 
The board of directors is traditionally one tier, but the shareholders’ general meeting must 
appoint also a board of statutory auditors whose main task is to monitor the directors’ 
performance (Melis, 2004). Published studies showed that during the ‘90s the board of 
directors in Italy was under the direct influence of large blockholders: its composition was 
characterized by the presence of inside directors or outside directors related to the controlling 
shareholders by family or business ties, the executive committee tended to absorb most of the 
board key tasks, there were few board meetings, the information sent to directors was 
incomplete and filtered by managers, there was neither an ex ante definition nor an ex post 
formal evaluation of directors’ contribution (Molteni, 1997; Melis, 1999 and 2000). 
Recent reforms in commercial law (1998, 2003, and 2005) and the introduction and update of 
a code of best practice (1999, 2002, and 2006) have contributed to radically change the Italian 
governance system. The legal reforms strengthen investors’ protection by regulating relevant 
issues such as public bids, shareholders’ agreements, minority shareholders’ rights, internal 
controls, corporate groups, and the board of directors. At the same time the code of best 
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practice has contributed to improve governance practices at board level, by encouraging 
transparency in the appointment of directors, a larger proportion of non-executive and 
independent directors, the introduction of a lead independent director in firms with CEO 
duality, the adoption of boards committees, the definition of stringent internal control 
systems, a more active role of statutory auditors, and the monitoring of transactions with third 
parties. These institutional changes have contributed to improve governance standards and to 
empower boards of directors in large Italian companies (Zattoni, 2006). 
 
Sample and data collection 
The sample frame for this study consisted of the 2,000 largest Italian manufacturing firms 
ranked by sales, extracted from Dun & Bradstreet. In June 2004, we sent a questionnaire to all 
the CEOs of these companies1. We decided to target the CEO given his knowledge of the 
strategy of the firm and our intention to study the advice and networking tasks (beyond the 
more traditional monitoring task) (Forbes and Milliken, 1999: 492-493). Our choice is in line 
with previous governance studies which also used primary data (Pearce and Zahra, 1991; 
Zahra, 1996; Zahra, Neubaum and Huse, 2000).  
Surveys of top managers have often suffered from low response rates, less than 25 percent 
(Pettigrew, 1992; Westphal, 1999). To ensure the highest possible response rate, we followed 
the steps consolidated in survey research methodology (Carpenter and Westphal, 2001; 
Fowler, 1993, Groves, Cialdini and Couper, 1992): (1) an in-depth pre-test was used to 
streamline the questionnaire, making it more appealing and easier to complete; (2) requests 
for participation emphasized the need for further research on board of directors and tried to 
engage respondents’ natural interest in the topic; and (3) in September 2004, the CEOs were 
sent a second letter and the questionnaire. 
To enhance the construct validity of the survey measures, we conducted a pre-test and 
interviewed 12 board members (Fowler, 1993: 102). Feedbacks from participants were used 
to ensure that the questions captured the concepts as we intended. Each individual was then 
asked to identify questions that were unclear, difficult to answer or potentially subject to bias. 
These interviews were also aimed to improve the format of the survey, to modify its length 
and to ensure that questions were interpreted as expected. Multiple response formats were 
used to reduce response bias, and items measuring each construct were scattered throughout 
the survey (DeVellis, 1991). Moreover, we carefully worded questions to minimize the 
likelihood of a social desirability bias, using inputs from the pilot interviews. All our 
questions were close-ended. 
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In total 301 CEOs responded, representing a response rate of 15.0 percent. In line with the 
Italian settings, these companies’ ownership structure is characterized by the presence of a 
large blockholder with at least a 20% stake in the firm’s equity.  
To check for non-response bias, we collected archival data for companies in the larger sample 
frame. Data on the firms' characteristics were gathered from the AIDA and Datastream 
databases. For companies with complete data, we examined whether respondents and non-
respondents differed significantly on several variables using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov two-
sample test (Siegel and Castellan, 1988). The results provide consistent evidence across 
multiple variables that respondents and non-respondents come from the same population. 
We ran a factor analysis for survey items related to all dependent and independent variables. 
The iterated principal factors method (promax rotation) showed that items loaded on six 
different factors as expected, with loadings for each item greater than .6 on one factor and less 
than .4 on the other. Specific items and Cronbach’s alpha indicators for each variable are 
presented in the following section (see also Table 1). 
 
Dependent measures 
Data for our three dependent variables, board service performance, board monitoring 
performance, and board networking performance were collected through the survey and 
assessed with a 5-point Likert Scale. The wording of each question was developed from the 
qualitative research available (Demb and Neubauer, 1992; Lorsch and Maclver, 1989; Stiles 
and Taylor, 2001).  
We define board service performance as the extent to which the board actively participates in 
strategic decision-making and the quality of its contribution to the CEO. Board service 
performance was measured as the extent to which (i) the board takes long-term strategic 
decisions; (ii) the board contributes to the implementation of strategic decisions; (iii) the 
board’s suggestions frequently improve strategic decisions (Carpenter and Westphal, 2001; 
Forbes and Milliken, 1999; Stiles and Taylor, 2001; Zahra and Pearce, 1989). Cronbach’s 
alpha was .77 for the service scale. 
We define board monitoring performance as the degree to which the board exerts its control 
function on the firm’s activities and on the CEO’s behavior. Board monitoring performance 
was measured as the extent to which the board (i) monitors the firm’s financial position; (ii) 
ensures that the firm’s activities are adequately controlled; (iii) monitors the CEO; (iv) 
controls plans and budgets (Forbes and Milliken, 1999; Stiles and Taylor, 2001). Cronbach’s 
alpha was .75 for the monitoring scale. 
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We define board networking performance as the degree to which the board contributes to 
strengthen contacts with relevant stakeholders and legitimize the company in its environment. 
Board networking performance was measured as the extent to which the board (i) provides 
contacts with relevant stakeholders; (ii) contributes to legitimize the company (Hillman and 
Dalziel, 2003; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Cronbach’s alpha was .82 for the networking 
scale. 
In order to enhance the construct validity of our dependent variables, we correlated them with 
archival data on firm performance.  
It has been noted that board members often compare their firm performance to the average 
industry performance (Meindl, Ehrlich, and Dukerich, 1985; Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny, 
1989). Therefore we measured indicators of the firm performance in relation to its 
competitors in the same industry. In particular, we measured the distance of each firm’s ROE 
from the median ROE of the most comparable firms (as measured by operating revenues; 
including the firm in question) in years 2002-2003-2004. We then calculated the 
improvements of the firm’s ROE performance relative to its direct competitors in years 
2002/03 and 2003/04. Finally, we averaged these improvements, in order to identify the 
structural pattern of the firm performance. 
Our results show a positive and significant correlation between this measure of the firm's 
relative performance and our measure of board service performance (r = .137, n = 210, p < 
.05). We also find a positive and significant correlation between the firm's relative 
performance and the board monitoring performance (r = .188, n = 210, p < .01). Finally, the 
correlation between the firm relative performance and our measure of networking 
performance is positive and significant (r = .139, n = 211, p < .05).  
 
Independent measures 
Data for our independent variables, cognitive conflict, effort norms, and use of knowledge and 
skills were gathered through a survey and assessed with a 5-point Likert Scale. In order to 
enhance the construct validity of the survey measures, we carried out the same pre-test for 
independent variables as we had conducted for dependent variables.  
Cognitive conflict was measured with a multi-item scale for task conflict developed by Jehn 
(1995). Specific items assess how frequently there are conflicts and disagreements (i) among 
directors; (ii) on decisions to be taken; (iii) on how the board should work; (iv) on how to 
pursue the firm’s goal. Cronbach’s alpha for this scale was .86.  
Effort norms was measured following Wageman’s (1995) example. Specific items assess the 
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extent to which directors (i) use their skills and knowledge to fulfil board tasks; (ii) are 
available when needed; (iii) devote all the time needed to complete the task assigned; (iv) 
participate actively during meetings. Cronbach’s alpha for this scale was .76. 
Use of knowledge and skills was measured drawing on past literature (Forbes and Milliken, 
1999; McGrath, MacMillan and Venkataraman, 1995). Specific items assess the extent to 
which (i) task delegation on the board represents a good match between knowledge and 
responsibilities; (ii) there is a clear division of labor among directors; (iii) information flows 
quickly among board members. Cronbach’s alpha for this scale was .79. 
 
[Insert Table 1] 
 
Control measures 
We selected demographic measures from the literature on boards of directors. The  
demographic variables most commonly considered in these studies are board size, outsider 
ratio, CEO duality, CEO ownership and the percentage of owner-directors (Brunninge & 
Nordqvist 2004; Daily, Dalton and Cannella, 2003; Dalton et al., 1998; Dalton et al., 2003; 
Johnson, Daily and Ellstrand, 1996). Given the characteristics of our sample, CEO ownership 
controls for the possibility that the CEO may also be a blockholder of the firm. We also 
considered the percentage of owner directors – i.e., the number of directors holding shares in 
the firm divided by the total number of directors – since in Italy some directors may be tied to 
the firm via stock holdings.  
We controlled for firm characteristics: firm size, measured as the logarithmic transformation 
of sales, and listing (Pye and Pettigrew, 2005). We also controlled for industry regulation 
(Pye and Pettigrew, 2005). We measured industry regulation by asking the CEO to rate it on a 
5-point Likert scale.  
 
RESULTS 
Table 2 provides means, standard deviations, and bivariate correlations for all variables. 
 
[Insert Table 2] 
 
We used multiple Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression analysis since all our dependent 
variables are continuous and the independent variables are continuous or categorical. 
Collinearity diagnostics showed that regression results are not affected by multicollinearity 
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among independent variables. The tolerance statistics of our independent variables are all well 
above 0.6, much higher than the minimum threshold of 0.2 (Menard, 1995).  
Results of the multiple regression analysis testing hypothesis 1a, 2a, 3a support the prediction 
that Effort norms (t=.41; p<.001) and Use of knowledge and skills (t=.17; p<.01) are 
positively associated with board service task performance, whereas the coefficient of 
Cognitive conflict is not significant. Among control variables, only industry regulation has a 
weak positive relationship with board service performance (t=.09; p<.10).  
In respect of the board monitoring task performance, results of the multiple regression 
analysis testing hypothesis 1b, 2b, 3b support the prediction that Effort norms (t=.22; p<.001) 
and Use of knowledge and skills (t=.19; p<.001) are positively associated with board 
monitoring performance, whereas the coefficient of Cognitive conflict is not significant. 
Among board demographic variables, only the coefficient of board size is significant and 
positive (t=.14; p<.05). Results also showed that board monitoring is higher in listed 
companies (t=.19; p<.001) and in firms operating in regulated industries (t=.13; p<.05).  
Finally, with respect to hypothesis 1c, 2c, and 3c, our results support the idea that Cognitive 
conflict (t=.14; p<.05), Effort Norms (t=.12; p<.10) and Use of knowledge and skills (t=.17; 
p<.05) positively impact on board networking task performance. As for the demographic 
variables, we find owner-directors ratio (t=.13; p<.05) and outsider ratio (t=.12; p<.10) to be 
positively related to board networking performance. Moreover, networking task performance 
is higher in regulated industries (t=.14; p<.05). 
 
[Insert Table 3] 
 
DISCUSSION 
In recent years scholars of boards of directors have called for new studies to be based on 
approaches other than the dominant agency framework. Furthermore, the ability of 
demographic variables to catch the real factors leading to superior board performance has 
been questioned, and the use of process variables has been called for (Dalton et al. 1998; 
Daily, Dalton and Cannella, 2003; Johnson, Daily and Ellstrand, 1996; Pitcher, Chreim and 
Kisfalvi, 2000; Pye and Pettigrew, 2005; Roberts, McNulty and Stiles, 2005). In this paper we 
have addressed both these issues: we have considered boards as workgroups performing 
different tasks and have analyzed the impact of internal processes on three different board 
task performances. The paper provides an empirical test of theoretical propositions aimed at 
opening up the “black box”, focusing on board internal processes in order to overcome the 
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limitations of demographic variables (Forbes and Milliken, 1999; Huse, 2005; Pettigrew, 
1992; Pye and Pettigrew, 2005).  
We believe that our findings contribute to improving our understanding of what determines 
board performance. In particular, our study shows that (a) process variables and, to a lesser 
extent, demographic variables significantly influence board task performance; (b) board 
processes have a different impact on each specific board task; (c) board task performance 
varies according to various characteristics of the firm and industry.  
Firstly, extant literature on board of directors analyzed the relationship between demographic 
variables and firm performance, without finding consistent empirical evidence (Daily, Dalton 
and Cannella, 2003; Dalton et al. 1998; Johnson, Daily and Ellstrand, 1996; Pye and 
Pettigrew, 2005). Instead of focusing on the firm performance, in this paper we analyzed the 
relationship between board demography, board processes and board task performance. Our 
results indicate that board processes, in particular effort norms and use of knowledge and 
skills, significantly influence board task performance. Board demographic characteristics also 
play a role: board size has been found to positively influence board monitoring performance; 
the outsider ratio and owner-directors ratio are positively associated with the networking task 
performance. Even if we cannot draw conclusive results, our study does suggest that more 
research is needed on how demographic variables and process variables may interact or 
jointly influence the board task performance. 
Secondly, our results show that board service, monitoring, and networking task performance 
are influenced differently by board processes (Kula, 2005; Pettigrew and McNulty, 1998; 
Wan and Ong, 2005). With regards to board networking performance, both Cognitive conflict 
and Use of knowledge and skills have been found to positively influence board task 
performance, whereas we have found only weak support for the hypothesized positive 
relationship between Effort norms and board networking performance. On the contrary, when 
it comes to board service and monitoring performance, Use of knowledge and skills and Effort 
norms are positively associated with board performance, whereas Cognitive conflict does not 
exert any significant influence. These results seem to suggest that different board task 
performances may be differently influenced by board processes. In particular, the 
unrelatedness of Cognitive conflict to both service and monitoring task performance supports 
the idea advanced in organization studies that its effect on group performance may be 
ambiguous (Jehn, 1995): actually, cognitive conflict may favor the emergence of negative 
emotions among group-members, counterbalancing its positive effects on the group’s task 
performance (Forbes and Milliken, 1999). Moreover, it is worth noting that the Use of 
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knowledge and skills, i.e., the process by which members' contributions are coordinated, is 
positively associated with board task performances: this finding seems to suggest that in 
episodic decision-making groups facing complex tasks, such as boards of directors, a key 
factor determining board effectiveness is the way in which directors’ individual skills and 
expertise are integrated. We maintain that board’s outcome may be less than the sum of its 
parts if individual contributions are not well integrated (Forbes and Milliken, 1999; Pye and 
Pettigrew, 2005).  
Our study also indicates that board task performance is higher in regulated industries and 
listed companies, suggesting that the external context does influence board conduct and may 
shape the criteria against which board effectiveness can be measured (Pye and Pettigrew, 
2005). In particular, they suggest that external scrutiny – by financial investors as in the case 
of listed corporations and by regulatory authorities as in the case of companies operating in 
regulated industries – encourages the boards to accomplish their tasks more effectively.  
The study has some limitations that may provide opportunities for future work. First, 
following the indications of Jehn (1995) and Forbes and Milliken (1999), we measured 
cognitive conflict asking respondents to estimate its intensity (see table 1). As Eisenhardt and 
Bourgeois (1988) have noted, conflict needs to be brought to the surface and then resolved. 
Drawing on a richer qualitative approach (Ravasi and Zattoni, 2006), future studies may 
include the resolution of the cognitive conflict among directors and deepen our knowledge on 
how it may affect decision-making processes in the boardroom. 
Second, following previous governance studies (Pearce and Zahra, 1989; Zahra, 1996; Zahra, 
Neubaum and Huse, 2000), our research is based on a single respondent, i.e., the CEO. 
Governance scholars traditionally choose to target the CEO because of the many difficulties 
of gaining access to primary data (Daily, Dalton and Cannella, 2003). Even if we did validate 
our measures of board task performance by correlating them with archival data, the choice to 
target the CEO may represent a limitation of this study. The Chairperson could also have been 
used as a respondent given his role inside the board. Either choice – the CEO or the 
Chairperson – may be pursued because the Chairperson is in charge of managing the board, 
while the CEO is in charge of managing the company. To strengthen our knowledge of how 
board processes influence board task performance, future studies may try to have multiple 
respondents, including the valuation of the Chairperson and of other directors.  
Third, in common with the large majority of research on corporate governance, our study is 
based on a cross sectional analysis. A recent review of papers published in six leading general 
management journals showed that the 127 empirical studies of boards of directors which had 
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been published in the period 1990-2002 were largely biased toward cross-sectional research 
design (Gabrielsson and Huse, 2004). To improve our knowledge of the dynamic 
configuration of governance structures and processes, future studies should take a longitudinal 
perspective by comparing and contrasting data and analyses over several years. The 
participant observation method could be very profitable for this purpose (Samra-Fredericks, 
2000a and 2000b). 
This paper has also some implications for practitioners. Corporate governance literature has 
traditionally focused on a limited number of board characteristics (i.e., board size, CEO 
duality, outsider ratio) as a determinant of board effectiveness. Nowadays, the emerging 
corporate governance ratings evaluate a wider range of criteria, but all these criteria are also 
focused on the structural characteristics of boards (Van den Berghe and Levrau, 2004). Our 
findings support the view that board task performance is not only related to how boards are 
structured and that demographic variables do not automatically lead to more effective boards 
(Finkelstein and Mooney, 2003). In our study we show that the effectiveness of boards of 
directors is strongly influenced by group-level processes such as open and critical debate 
(cognitive conflict), directors’ commitment to fulfilling their role (effort norms), and the 
coordination of directors’ contribution (use of knowledge and skills) (Forbes and Milliken, 
1999). Overall, our analysis supports the idea that board design involves both structural and 
process variables (Finkelstein and Mooney, 2003; Forbes and Milliken, 1999; Pye and 
Pettigrew, 2005; Roberts, McNulty and Stiles, 2005).  
In sum, in order to create well-functioning boards it is not sufficient to demand changes in 
board demography, i.e., to add more independent directors, as codes of good governance 
recommend. On the contrary, boards wanting to improve their task performance must devote 
more attention to their internal processes (Finkelstein and Mooney, 2003; Pye and Pettigrew, 
2005). Much work needs to be done: we believe that peer-evaluation of board practices and 
training may dramatically improve the board's contribution to the firm performance.  
 
Conclusions 
Our research explores the relationship between board processes and board task performance, 
using primary data to open up the black box of board demography. We contribute to the 
extant literature on boards of directors by showing that board processes influence board task 
performance, and that board demographic variables may also play a role. Research on boards 
should consider both demographic and process variables as antecedents of board performance 
in its service, monitoring and networking tasks. Future research on board decision-making 
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and processes is needed to have a much clearer picture of how board demography and 
processes interact and influence board task performance. Researchers are invited to draw on 
existing literature on group dynamics and effectiveness and to use qualitative methods, such 
as case studies, to gain a clearer understanding of board dynamics.  
Since directors may exert informal influence on managerial behavior outside regular 
meetings, future research may focus on the actual behavior of directors (inside and outside the 
boardroom) with the aim of analyzing when and how they contribute to board effectiveness 
(Pettigrew and McNulty, 1998). Moreover, we believe that the contribution provided by 
directors may depend upon their appointment to a specific committee (Klein, 1998): in our 
opinion, in future studies it would be interesting to assess how a director’s participation in 
committees may influence board processes and the group performance. Finally, governance 
scholars should pay attention to the inner and outer contexts, since we feel they may play a 
role in how board processes influence board task performance (Pye and Pettigrew, 2005). 
 
NOTES 
1. Governance studies incorporating primary data are traditionally based on a single respondent, typically the 
CEO (Pearce and Zahra, 1991; Zahra, 1996; Zahra, Neubaum and Huse, 2000). This is due to difficulties in 
gaining access to process data on boards of directors, given the inherent confidentiality of their activities (Daily, 
Dalton and Cannella, 2003; Pettigrew, 1992; Pye, 2001). Furthermore, recent scandals and governance reforms 
have, if anything, contributed to further reducing the access of governance scholars to board members because of 
the increased fear of legal action against them. 
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The board contributes to the implementation of strategic decisions 0.79
The board takes long-term strategic decisions 0.76
Board’s suggestions frequently improve strategic decisions 0.68
Monitoring 0.75
The board ensures firm’s activities to be adequately controlled 0.81
The board monitors the firm’s financial position 0.70
The board controls plans and budgets 0.64
The board monitors the CEO 0.54
Networking 0.82
The board contributes to legitimize the company 0.85
The board provides contacts with relevant stakeholders 0.84
Cognitive conflict 0.86
There are frequently conflicts and disagreements among directors 0.83
There are frequently conflicts and disagreements on decisions to be taken 0.81
There are frequently conflicts and disagreements on how the board should 
work 0.78
There are frequently conflicts and disagreements on how to pursue the firm's 
goal 0.72
Effort norms 0.76
Directors use their skills and knowledge to fulfill board tasks 0.79
Directors are available when needed 0.69
Directors devote all the time needed to complete the task assigned 0.67
Directors actively participate during meetings 0.57
Use of knowledge and skills 0.79
Task delegation on the board represents a good match between knowledge 
and responsibilities 0.91
There is a clear division of labor among directors 0.71
Information flows quickly among board members. 0.64
Table 1






Variable Mean s.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
1.   Service 3.41 0.96
2.   Monitoring 3.60 0.86 .55
3.   Networking 2.66 1.17 .36 .33
4.   Cognitive conflict 1.73 0.76 .00 .00 .10
5.   Effort norms 4.06 0.72 .50 .33 .21 -.12
6.   Use of knowledge & skills 3.72 0.91 .39 .25 .18 -15 .50
7.   Perc. owner-directors 0.19 029 .03 -.06 .16 .05 .09 .14
8.   CEO ownership 0.09 0.20 .00 -.06 .07 -.09 .03 .07 .23
9.  CEO duality 0.30 0.46 .01 -.01 -.02 -.07 .01 -.09 -.07 .32
10. Outsider ratio 0.45 0.34 -.01 .09 .09 -.00 -.11 -.23 -.12 -17 -.07
11. Board size 7.25 4.11 -.06 .16 .03 -.00 -.09 -.17 -.18 -.14 .03 .45
12. Regulated industry 2.92 1.55 .13 .18 .15 .07 .08 .00 .05 .02 .01 -.08 -.05
13. Listing 0.24 0.42 .09 .28 .17 -.04 .10. -.02 -.09 -.00 .05 .33 .30 .07
14. Firm size 5.56 1.59 -.06 .07 -.05 -.02 08 -.12 -.16 .19 -.05 .10 .13 .08 .10
n = 301 CEOs; for correlations lower than - .10   and greater than   .11    p <  .05
TABLE  2





Hypothesis 1a, 2a, 3a Hypothesis 1b, 2b, 3b Hypothesis 1c, 2c, 3c
Service Monitoring Networking
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Independent Variables
Cognitive conflict .07 .05 .14 *
Effort norms .41 *** .22 *** .12 †
Use of knowledge and skills .17 ** .19 *** .17 *
Perc. owner-directors .06 .00 .00 -.03 .17 *** .13 *
CEO ownership -.03 -.03 .00 -.01 .06 .07
CEO duality .00 .04 -.05 -.01 -.05 -.01
Outsider ratio -.11 -.03 -.01 .05 .07 .12 †
Board size -.03 .01 .10 .14 * .01 .03
Regulated industry .13 .09 † .16 *** .13 * .15 * .14 *
Listing .15 .07 .24 *** .19 *** .14 * .10
Firm Size -.80 -.10 .02 .03 -.08 -.07
F 1.70 * 9.70 *** 4.14 *** 6.94 *** 3.18 *** 4.19 ***
Adj R 2 .02 † .27 *** .09 *** .21 *** .06 *** .12 ***
DR 2 .25 *** .12 *** .06 ***
       †  p <  .10
       *  p <  .05
      **  p <  .01
     ***  p < .001
TABLE 3
Results of Multiple Regressions Analysisa
   a  Standardized coefficients are reported in the table; n = 301 
 
 
 
